Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
The effectiveness of the Pilot Program should improve if the Army develops metrics and goals that measure achievements of the program. Also, the Army should increase monitoring efforts of the bids submitted and contracts awarded under the Pilot Program. Additionally, the Army should examine the cost-cutting measures used at Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, as well as measures used at other facilities and implement the measures where appropriate. The Army should also increase awareness of the Pilot Program to increase workload at the three Army industrial facilities (see the Finding section of the report for the detailed recommendations).
Management Comments.
We provided the draft of this report on April 18, 2003. The Army did not comment because of ongoing higher priority issues. Comments on the final report are requested from the Army by July 28, 2003.
ii (1)). In carrying out the review and preparing the report, the Inspector General shall take into consideration the report submitted to Congress under such subsection (as so redesignated).
The congressionally mandated questions and the Office of the Inspector General answers are at Appendix C.
Guidance for Sale of Articles and Services Outside of DoD
Section 141 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1998 required that the Army conduct a Pilot Program that tests the efficacy and appropriateness of selling manufactured articles and services of Army industrial facilities under 10 U.S.C. 4543. The Pilot Program waives 10 U.S.C. 4543, which requires that the Secretary of the Army determine whether an article or service is available from a commercial source in the United States. The waiver relates specifically to the sale of articles for a weapon system the DoD is procuring or the sale of services used in the manufacture of any weapon system the DoD is procuring. The Pilot Program allows the Army industrial facilities to compete for commercial contracts of manufactured articles and services without regard to the availability of the articles and services from U.S. commercial sources. Implementation of the Pilot Program is limited to three Army industrial facilities.
Pilot Program Facilities
The 
Objective
The audit objective was to determine the status of the Pilot Program. 
Pilot Program Status

Impediments of the Pilot Program
The Army industrial facility personnel we interviewed as well as IG DoD Report No. D-2001-069 and IG DoD Report No. 99-203 note that advance payments and charging full costs were impediments to the success of the Pilot Program. Army industrial facility personnel also stated that high overhead rates were an impediment. We could not determine why the three Army industrial facilities were not awarded contracts from Pilot Program bids submitted because of a lack of data maintained on bids submitted. Army Industrial Personnel. Personnel from the three Army industrial facilities stated that high prices were a barrier for obtaining Pilot Program contracts. However, only MCAAP officials contacted the contractor to request a reason for bid rejection. One MCAAP official stated that cost was the most common reason contractors provided for not awarding contracts. RIA officials stated that rates were fully burdened and, although based on personal opinion, if the rates were not fully burdened, RIA would have received an increased number of contracts under the Pilot Program. RIA officials also stated that RIA incurred costs as a result of a reduction in force, and the cost associated with the reduction was absorbed in the cost to customers. WVA also stated that the wording of the Financial Management Regulation was a barrier because it requires the arsenals to charge a fully burdened overhead rate as part of the cost to customers. Overhead Rates. Personnel at the three industrial facilities stated that high overhead rates inhibited the facilities from obtaining Pilot Program contracts. According to officials at MCAAP and RIA, high overhead rates at both facilities prevented them from being competitive with commercial vendors. At WVA, where overhead rates were the highest, officials stated that an increasing number of uncontrollable costs at the installation level are restricting the ability to reduce unit costs. WVA officials further stated that, although the costs can be forecasted, the installation had no control over policies or decisions that change the costs during the execution year. One WVA official stated, "As the total workload decreases, these costs constitute an increasingly larger percentage of the total program and are fixed. The reduction in direct labor workload, combined with a higher percentage of fixed costs, elevates the unit cost of the installation's products."
Although the overhead rates at the three industrial facilities have decreased, the effect of the decrease on facility competitiveness with commercial vendors is uncertain. WVA had the highest overhead rates. WVA still managed to obtain about $11. The Pilot Program contracts constituted a small percentage of the overall value of contracts for the three facilities. In fact, Pilot Program contracts were about 1 percent of the total contracts at MCAAP and RIA (similar data from WVA were unavailable). The numbers also included three orders totaling $1,119,307 on one contract that MCAAP entered into prior to the Pilot Program. Additionally, while Pilot Program contracts at WVA were primarily responsible for the $10.9 million increase in contract awards, WVA personnel did not consider them to be Pilot Program contracts. Contracting officials at JMC and personnel from the three facilities acknowledged that, regardless of the waiver, the contracts would have been awarded to the facilities. Army industrial facility personnel indicated that barriers such as charging full cost, advance payments, and high overhead rates were actually hindering the Pilot Program. Because of a lack of data related to bids submitted for the Pilot Program, we cannot substantiate the causes for the lack of success of the Pilot Program that Army personnel provided.
Pilot Program Areas of Concern
We believe that the following information Army personnel provided about Pilot Program goals, data management, Pilot Program determination, retaining a skilled workforce, marketing of the Pilot Program, and a high percentage of unutilized capacity is worth noting. Lack of established goals and objectives of the Pilot Program hindered the ability to measure the degree of successfulness of the Pilot Program. The inability to distinguish Pilot Program data from other operations of the three industrial facilities hindered the Army from making changes in policies that would benefit the Pilot Program and the facilities. Also, misunderstandings exist between the Army industrial facilities and JMC regarding when a contract should be classified as a Pilot Program contract. Officials at the industrial facilities expressed that lack of funding resulted in difficulties in retaining a skilled workforce and marketing the facilities capabilities. Finally, based on information the three industrial facilities provided, unutilized plant capacity at the three industrial facilities remained consistently high from October 2000 through November 2002.
Pilot Program Goals. Goals were not established for the Pilot Program. Army industrial personnel indicated that no goals existed for the Pilot Program at the three industrial facilities. Personnel at MCAAP and RIA stated that any work the Pilot Program generated makes the program a success. Because no goals were established for the Pilot Program, the extent to which the Pilot Program was successful could not be measured. Army personnel should establish metrics and goals that measure the achievements of the Pilot Program. Goals should be established for reducing overhead costs, increasing workload, and utilizing plant capacity as a result of the Pilot Program. To determine successfulness of the Pilot Program, Army personnel should have a method for comparing actual data with the goals.
Data Management. None of the personnel at the three Army industrial facilities maintained detailed data that would allow for easy identification of Pilot Program bids or the reasons for rejection of the bids submitted. Only the personnel at MCAAP could manually sort through contract files and provide copies of Pilot Program bids. RIA and WVA personnel were unable to distinguish between bids placed through the Pilot Program and bids submitted through other operations at the facilities. Additionally, only the MCAAP personnel stated that they attempted to follow up with contractors to determine the reasons for bid rejections but rarely included the explanation in contract files. Army personnel should follow up when bids submitted do not result in contract award and capture data that identifies strengths and shortfalls of the Pilot Program bids. Retaining a Skilled Workforce at the Facilities. Maintaining a skilled workforce is critical to the success of programs such as the Pilot Program that are aimed at lowering costs and increasing workload at industrial facilities. The average age of employees at the three Pilot Program facilities ranged from 45 to 49 years, making most of the workforce eligible for retirement within 5 to 10 years. In the past, the facilities used apprenticeship programs to replenish the core skill areas. Reductions in force throughout the 1990s and lack of funding provided to the arsenals forced the suspension of apprenticeship programs. MCAAP developed a program in which students receive job-related training at MCAAP. Once the academic studies are completed, students may be non-competitively converted to career-conditional appointments with MCAAP. RIA has reestablished an apprenticeship program; however, lack of funding has hindered the success of the program. Additionally, WVA has been unable to reinitiate an apprenticeship program because of the lack of funding.
Awareness of the Pilot Program. Limited marketing of the Pilot Program by
Army personnel has not generated significant additional work for the three industrial facilities. Since the beginning of FY 2001, only seven new contracts have been awarded. Marketing of the Pilot Program is accomplished almost exclusively in conjunction with other facility programs. MCAAP personnel stated that commercial marketing of the Pilot Program is basically done by word of mouth. At RIA, personnel stated they participate in trade shows, and the facility Web site includes Pilot Program information but most marketing for RIA is accomplished through current contractors and contractor contacts. WVA lacks the funds needed to market the Pilot Program. Based on the number of contracts issued as of November 2002, each industrial facility needs to increase awareness of the Pilot Program.
Unutilized Plant Capacity. Regardless of the fluctuations in the amount of unutilized plant capacity at the three industrial facilities, the facilities reported about 80 percent unutilized plant capacity. Based on data that personnel at Army industrial facilities provided, unutilized plant capacity levels at both MCAAP and WVA remain consistently greater than 70 percent. The unutilized capacity at RIA exceeds 80 percent. Army personnel stated that unutilized plant capacity may fluctuate based on DoD operations. Although each of the three industrial facilities has obtained work under the Pilot Program, the program has not decreased the amount of unutilized plant capacity.
Alternate Methods for Regenerating Workloads
The Army should examine other methods for regenerating workload at depots and arsenals such as the public-private partnerships used at Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, the Ground Systems Industrial Enterprise (GSIE) concepts, and the Arsenal Support Program Initiative. Teaming with private industry or other Army industrial facilities and allowing tenants the use of industrial facilities in conjunction with the Pilot Program may reduce unutilized plant capacity and overhead rates.
Anniston Army Depot Public-Private Partnerships. The Anniston Army Depot initiated discussions with private industries with the intent of building a network of tenant activities that could successfully generate workload and utilize otherwise idle workspace at the depot. Anniston Army Depot has more than 30 partnerships and teaming arrangements. The teaming arrangements capitalize on the strengths and efficiencies of both the public and private sector. According to officials from GSIE, which is under the command of Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, Anniston Army Depot represents the way the Army should conduct business. Anniston Army Depot participates in three types of partnership programs: workshare programs, direct sales, and facility use programs. Anniston officials believe that public-private partnerships effectively reduced the cost of maintaining the facility at Anniston Army Depot.
Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, GSIE. The Tank-automotive and Armaments Command is developing a concept through GSIE designed to scale down operations while maintaining core capabilities that support both the Army as well as customers outside of the Army. GSIE plans to operate six arsenals and depots--Rock Island Arsenal; Watervliet Arsenal; Sierra Army Depot, California; Anniston Army Depot; Lima Army Tank Plant, Ohio; and Red River Depot, Texas--as a single business unit. GSIE designed a concept for effectively using the core capabilities at the Army industrial facilities. For that concept to work, GSIE officials stated that DoD financial regulations must reflect current laws and business practice. Additionally, GSIE officials believe that one comprehensive statute governing all sales outside the DoD will eliminate confusion among the varying provisions and language caused by current direct sales statutes. Tank-automotive and Armaments Command personnel have drafted proposed changes to applicable DoD financial policies and statutory guidance. The changes would allow the facilities to operate more cost effectively. Also, because two facilities within GSIE participate in the Pilot Program, the waiver of 10 U.S.C. 4543 could provide additional assistance to GSIE as a whole.
Arsenal Support Program Initiative. The Arsenal Support Program Initiative enables commercial tenants on Army arsenal property to play a part in helping reduce unutilized plant capacity and overhead costs. Authorized by the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2001, the initiative is modeled after the Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support Program for Army depots. WVA implemented the program and has acquired one tenant, but because implementation is in the early stages, success cannot yet be measured. According to JMC officials, however, one facility under the Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support Program totally covered their operation costs through the use of tenants.
Conclusion
Use of the three participating Army industrial facilities minimally increased from the Pilot Program. Between the first 25-month period (about $6 million in contracts) and the next 26-month period (about $16.9 million in contracts), the workload increased by about $10.9 million. The three facilities, as of November 2002, were still reporting unutilized plant capacity rates above 70 percent. Although the increased workload had a limited effect on the overhead rates or unutilized plant capacity at MCAAP, RIA, and WVA, any additional work is beneficial to the Army industrial facilities. However, officials at JMC and the three Army industrial facilities stated that contracts are usually awarded to the facilities because the articles and services are commercially unavailable. The Pilot Program in conjunction with public-private partnerships, GSIE concepts on streamlining operations at multiple Army industrial facilities, and the Arsenal Support Program Initiative could offer additional benefits for increasing workload and decreasing operational costs at the three Army industrial facilities.
Recommendations
We recommend the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology: 
Management Comments Required
The Department of the Army did not comment on a draft of this report. We request that the Department of the Army provide comments on the final report. We interviewed JMC personnel regarding contracts awarded under the Pilot Program and information on Armament Retooling and Management Support and Arsenal Support Program Initiative. We also interviewed Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, GSIE personnel to determine the changes that would make the Pilot Program a more viable operation.
We visited Anniston Army Depot to gain an understanding of their public-private partnerships, contracts, operating capacity, unutilized capacity, overhead and total rates, workforce strength, and marketing.
We performed this audit from August 2002 through April 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The audit scope was limited to the request in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2003. We used and relied on data that Army industrial personnel provided for the operating capacity, unutilized capacity, overhead and total rates, and workforce strength. We did not review the management control program.
Use of Computer-Processed Data. We relied on computer-processed data from JMC, located at RIA, in determining the number and dollar values of those contracts issued under the Pilot Program. We obtained hard copies of contracts issued from October 2000 through November 2002 and compared those contracts to the computer-processed data. JMC officials and the audit team noted minor clerical errors in the data, which had no material effect on the audit. We did not assess the reliability of the computer-processed contract data from Pilot Program inception through the end of FY 2000.
General Accounting Office High-Risk Area. The General Accounting Office has identified several high-risk areas in the DoD. This report provides coverage on the DoD high-risk area to overcome support infrastructure inefficiencies. Of the contracts issued, the Army industrial facilities and JMC personnel believe the facilities would have received most of the contracts without the use of the waiver in subsection (b). Also, the three Pilot Program sites maintain little data regarding Pilot Program bids and why U.S. concerns did not award contracts for bids submitted under the Pilot Program.
Issue 3. "The Inspector General's views regarding the effect of the waiver under subsection (b) on the ability of small businesses to compete for the sale of manufactured articles or services in the United States in competitions to enter into or participate in contracts and teaming arrangements under weapon system programs of the Department of Defense."
Results. We cannot determine the effect the program had on small businesses because only 19 basic contracts that used the waiver under subsection (b) were awarded between September 1998 and November 2002. We did not identify any opportunities or detriments to small businesses because of the waiver. Results. Because of the nature of work performed on the contracts under the Pilot Program, JMC officials believe that the Army industrial facilities would have received most of the work regardless of the waiver. Based on our review of contract documentation, Army industrial facilities received similar awards before the Pilot Program. When meeting with personnel at WVA, we were told that the contracts would have been awarded to the facilities because of no commercial sources.
The most obvious examples for the previous statement are the contracts awarded to WVA. JMC officials provided a list of Pilot Program contracts for WVA, which contained three contracts and three orders on one of those contracts. WVA believes they would have been awarded the contracts regardless of the waiver and denied that the contracts were issued under the Pilot Program. Through discussions, we determined that JMC considered the contracts under the Pilot Program because the contracts included a waiver of the need to determine commercial sources. JMC personnel admitted that many Pilot Program contracts would have been awarded without the benefits of the waiver. . The decreased overhead rates allow the industrial facilities to be more cost competitive when submitting bids for Pilot Program work. The declining overhead rates may be attributed to implementation of programs such as the Arsenal Support Program Initiative and other private-public partnership arrangements at the facilities. Those programs are designed to defray the cost for operating and maintaining any underutilized facilities by allowing commercial tenants to utilize excess industrial facility space. Although the Pilot Program does not apply to Anniston Army Depot, the public-private partnerships the depot used were effective in reducing the Government's cost to maintain the facility.
Based on prior IG DoD reports as well as our interviews with Army industrial facility personnel during the audit, the requirements that contractors pay before receiving articles and services (advance payments) and that Army industrial facilities charge full costs have hindered the effectiveness of the Pilot Program (see pages 4 and 5 of the finding for additional details).
According to statements and information provided by the facilities reviewed, most workers at the three Army industrial facilities are eligible for retirement within the next 5 to 10 years. Large numbers of skilled workers retiring threatens the effectiveness of the Army industrial facility programs. Reductions in force and the lack of apprenticeship programs at the Army industrial facilities reviewed have threatened the Army's ability to maintain a skilled workforce. MCAAP uses a program for students for which the students gain work experience with MCAAP while completing their education. Students may be non-competitively offered career-conditional appointments with MCAAP upon successful completion of their academic requirements. Apprenticeships have resumed at RIA, but lack of funding has hindered the progress at RIA and has prevented WVA from reinitiating their apprentice programs. Building and retaining a skilled workforce is critical to the facilities because many skilled employees were lost during the reductions in force.
Issue 6. "Any recommendations that the Inspector General considers appropriate regarding continuation or modification of the policy set forth in section 4543(a)(5) of title 10, United States Code."
Results. We have not identified any adverse effects of the program, although limited benefits were identified. We believe the Pilot Program should be continued. RIA noted that participating in the Pilot Program does not increase the cost of the facility. The ability of the Army industrial facilities to identify strengths and shortfalls of the program would be enhanced by increased monitoring of the program and data related to the bids submitted under the Pilot Program. However, an increased administrative burden may result from such monitoring. The Army industrial facilities could make adjustments to policies and procedures based on the additional data obtained when bids are submitted resulting in no awards and work performed at the facilities. In addition to increased monitoring of the Pilot Program, better marketing would raise awareness of the Pilot Program. An increase in monitoring and awareness of the Pilot Program along with implementation of other public-private partnership programs would likely be beneficial in increasing the workload at the three participating Army industrial facilities. (See the Finding section for additional details.)
